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Public economic policy in the seventies faces two conflicting tendencies. One is the failur~ of the economy to function at sufficiently high levels of 
employment and with sufficiently equitable distribution of income to provide 
adequate levels of living for everyone. An old problem perhaps, but in a 
relatively new context: political impatience with the failure of liberal, New Deal-style redistributive and stimulatory policies to do what they are designed to do. 
We need not here repeat the radical argument that these programs in fact are designed and used in ways to serve the established powers (e.g., Piven and Cloward's argument on welfare), instead we add what might be called the new 
"conservative" critique on efficiency and productivity grounds. That is, 
welfare, poverty and manpower programs, indirect regulatory mechanisms and bureaucracies, and highly aggrega'ted macroeconomic policy manipulation have 
weighed the sta·te sector down in a maze of bureaucracy and have sapped the 
strength of the economy, by using more and more tax money less and less 
efficiently. The New Deal is dead; the question remains: long live .•• 
what? 
On the national level the problem of how to replace New Deal macroeconomic policies is most acute. For some years, economists have beert aware that the 
range of macro-policies at their disposal only affect highly aggregated 
variables, and that specific industries, except for defense, were only affected by generally indirec~ regulatory and taxation mechanisms. Manipulation of 
these variables has been increasingly less successful in dealing with the problems of inflation and unemployment. Recently, Leontieff and Eckstein, 
among others, have called for broader national economic planning to make macro-policy more effective on an industry-by-industry level. However, the capability for that type of planning is far from being established. 
It is in these gener~l contexts that this working paper on public enterprise 
can be justified on a variety of grounds and can deal with a number of specific 
economic ills. It is also, in terms of the above issues, both a significantly 
more efficient way of organizing the state sector of the economy and gives the 
state a significantly more direct and disaggregated way of approaching the problem of planning. 
The term public enterprise refers to any enterprise of the state sector which involves direct state ownership and operation of the productive apparatus of 
the economy; and which primarily uses the criteria of self-support though the generation of revenues from its dealings with the public, private enterprises, 
or governmental agencies or enterprises. While the control of a public enter-
' prise rests with public bodies and its function is to serve the public interest, broadly defined, it is generally constrained by the criteria of self-support 
or profitability in its activites. We use the words "primarily" and "generally" because there are many cases in which public enterprises may operate0 at a loss by legislative restriction, its own definition of the public interest, or 
economic necessity. 
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There are numerous examples of public enterprise. The Port of Oakland, the 
Berkeley Marina, U. C. Press, parking garages in many cities, the several 
thousand municipally-owned and state-owned utility systems, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, N.Y.'s Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, many transit 
authorities, municipally-operated airports, and municipally-operated garbage 
companies are all examples of presently functioning public enterprises. Some 
of these are explicitly organized as semi-autonomous public corporations; 
others, such as some garbage collection services, operate as public enterprises 
in fact if not in name by the collection of user fees adequate to cover costs 
of operation. Still others, particularly transit systems, are organized as 
public enterprises but require massive subsidies. 
For the most part, public' enterpri~e ~n the U. S. have entered relatively 
limited arenas. These arenas have been those in which natural monopolies 
exist (utilities, bridges); where absolutely necessary services are being pro-
vided (garbage, transportation); where the scope of operations is so large as 
to preclude private enterprise (certain wat~r projects); where private enter-
prise has failed (transit systems, railroads (forthcoming)); to a lesser extent 
the promotion of economic development (airports, ports); and the use of 
already publicly owned valuable land (marinas, industrial parks). California 
has previously used the promotion of economic development as a justification 
in its Squaw Valley development for the Olympics (an unfortunate precedent). 
' 
The general criteria of self-support provides a political justification rela-
tively easy to make to a, tax-paying public. That is, public benefits can be 
provided without continual drain on the taxpayer. Criteria for continuation 
of a policy are ready-made; if a public enterprise cannot perform satisfactorily 
enough to support itself, there may be good argument for discontinuation. The 
same cannot often be said for many gover.nment programs. 
The most pressing argument .for direct state entry into the economy comes in the 
face of the failure of the state economy to achieve full employment, both for 
cyclical and structural reasons. For the alleviation of cyclical unemployment, 
the state can invest in sectors of the economy which have laid off workers due 
to cyclical fluctuations; can invest to alleviate critical bottlenecks which 
have slowed down productions; can initiate new enterprises which will generate 
direct and indirect employment; can stabilize output in key industries to smooth 
out the cycle; can encourage output by affecting the price level of key productive 
inputs; and can generate revenues to further employ more people. For structural 
unemployment, it can direct investment into depressed areas, and direct resources 
to those who normally would not have them. Just about every form of public enter-
prise can have positive employment effects, from development bank loans to land-
banking, to a state energy corporation. 
However, one simplified model, which we can call the California Gold Mining 
Corporation, is worth noting here for purpose of comparison with traditional 
public employment programs. Public employment costs the state the full wage of 
the worker, who is often employed in relatively non-productive, paper-pushing 
work with no direct return. If the state were to hire workers to mine gold, I 
and purchase or produce labor-intensive gold-mining equipment within the st~te, 
it could at least sell the gold ($170 per ounce) to generate more revenues to 
further employ more people. Even at a loss, the state is generating more employ-
• 
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ment per net dollar .expended than outright public employment, unless both gold mining and the production of equipment are heavily capital intensive or if administrative expenses are excessively high. 
State enterprises in sectors of the economy which are heavily monopolized can directly affect the price levels of goods by engaging in competititve pricing practices. A state energy corporation which lowered the price of energy to municipal utilities or generally to consumer is the most obvious way of how public enterprise can achieve this function. The state's ability to lower prices, applicable to any industry where prices are kept artifically high, might have indirect employment benefits through the stimulating effect of price reductions. 
A state commodities trading and stockpiling function could be used to counter the detrimental effects of commodities hoarding and speculation, either for California-produced commodities or world market commodities like sugar. In addition, the state purchasing,department could use its potential leverage power to lower the prices of goods bought by public institutions on all levels, again with indirect employment benefits and large revenue savings. Saskatchewan has state trading boards, and Federal agricultural programs have been involved in commodity trading. 
A state sector faced with increasing demands on its resources is impoverished partially by the indirectness of its sources of income; i.e., it must rely on taxation of surplus funds after the directly productive sector has generated income and profits. Were the state to enter into this process, it would have direct sources of funding rather than relying on squeezing the surplus, and could use this money for continued employment generation or general revenues and lower taxes. Utility operation is only one example of enterprises which could perform this function for the state, as it does in cities such as Palo Alto,- where up to 1/3 of general city revenues are generated yearly by the municipal utility. 
One form of structural unemployment stems from the existence of chronically depressed areas, often secondary cities in an urban complex, smaller rural cities, or rural areas dependent on seasonal employment or natural resource development. In addition, particular areas may be hard hit by the business cycle or by recession in particular industries. The ability to direct invest-ment funds to specific geographical locations, rather than general economic stimulation, is necessary for any substantial relief of long-term structural unemployment and for relief of overpopulation in urban areas. A Development Bank would have this ability, as would an Economic Development Corporation in its land-banking and direct investment functions, particularly in natural resources such as timber and mining. This power is presently used through decision to locate government facilities in particular places; it needs planning and extension. 
The redistributive capability of the state sector, mainly transfer payments and progressive taxation, involves ex post decisions after income has initially been distributed by the production process. Public enterprise ca,n direct income to poor communities, can train and employ low-income people directly, and can establish narrower income differentials within its enterprises. Examples here include various direct enterprises, state-aided CDC's and co-operati~s, worker-
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owned enterprises, and agricultural land-leasing policies. Again, the role 
of the state here has been long recognized; however, the actural mechanisms 
have been limited. 
Public enterprise can promote economic democracy through encouragement of CDC's, 
cooperatives, and union enterprises. More generally, legislative and public 
(gubernatorial appointment) participation in the decision-making of public 
corporations implies the representation of the public in major economic decisions. 
Also, publi<; corporations can experiment with worker's management. British 
Columbia and Saskatchewan have recognized this goal in a variety of ways, 
including establishment of producer cooperatives and encouraging some worker 
participation. In the U. S., farm cooperatives have been encouraged. 
Private profitability criteria exclude the production of certain goods which 
may be socially beneficial but do not provide immediate or subs.tantial returns 
on investment. Low and moderate income housing is the most obvious example of 
this failure; others may include a range of items from integrated recycling 
operations to provision of low-cost vacation facilities. The Defense establish-
ment is the most overwhelming example of use of this type of state function in 
the U. S., though it has abstained from direct ownership and management. Water 
resource development is another example of U. S. recognition of this function. 
Natural resource-using companies which must follow narrow profitability criteria 
may not be able to rationally plan environmentally-sound programs, particularly 
if long-range planning is, involved. The freedom of the public enterprise from 
maximum and short-run returns on investment can exploit resources such as timber 
and fisheries in environmentally rational ways, with the benefits accruing to 
the state, and employment maintained. 
Without public enterprise, the state must rely on indicative planning to develop 
its planning capacity. Such planning relies on the participation of private 
enterprise, which, whil~ attainable, leaves the state with little in the way of 
enforceable power, Planning power; ultimately rests with the investment decision, 
and public enterprise gives the state that direct investment capability. 
State Bank 
A. General purpose 
A bank shall be chartered by the state to serve as a financial intermediary 
between sources of finance for the state (e·.g., pension funds, sales of state 
renvenue bonds, treasury deposits, and direct allocations from the legislature) 
and those sectors of the state economy and geographical areas of the state where 
investment funds are needed both to serve the economic well-being of the people 
of the state and because investment funds are not otherwise forthcoming in 
sufficient amounts from the private sector. 
Economic well-being is defined in the following ways: (note: this is somewhat 
repetitive but is included here to give an indication of the type of legislatively-
specified mandate the bank might have: 
• 
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1. Immediate employment creation within the state in sectors of the 
economy or areas of the state where unemployment rates are excessively high. 
2. Aid to areas which are blighted or depressed in a long-term sense, 
and in which economic resources available to the community are insufficient to 
alleviate the conditions of poverty and unemployment, subemployment, and under-
employment. 
3. Production in sectors of the economy which have clearly recognizable 
positive public externalities (i.e., neighborhood or environmental effects) and 
for which private funds are not forthcoming. 
4. The maintenance of small enterprises which may be important to the 
state economy or to a particular area and which could operate profitably in the 
state if funds were available during a period of economic slowdown. 
5. The diffusion of economic power to the non-profit, democratically 
controlled sector of the economy. 
6. The maintenance of sectors which are critical to the economy and 
which, for reasons not related to state labor and produ~t markets, are diminishing 
their level of activity ,in the state. 
B. Areas of Activity , 
1. Capital to Community Development Corporations (CDC's). CDC's 
represent a significant way in which development in low income, chronically 
depressed areas can take place, provided there is sufficient technical assistance 
and sufficient sources of funding. The Bank could provide low-interest loans to 
CDC's, in conjunction with technical assistance from an Economic Development 
Corporation. It could also provide direct grants with specially earmarked funds 
for subsidy, or give equity capital with the expectation of royalties or dividends 
if the enterprise is successful. 
2. Capital to community-based cooperatives. While not all cooperatives 
are exclusively in low-income areas like CDC's, loan to them offer the possibility 
of expansion of the demqcratic, non-profit sector of the economy. Such co-ops 
can include cooperative farms as part of a rural development program, housing 
co-ops, consumer co-ops, craft production co-ops in urban and rural areas, co-ops 
organized in other directly productive activities, and media co-ops (newspapers, 
cabe TV, theatre), as examples. The Cooperative League of America sees great 
potential for expansion of this sector, with financing and proper organization. 
3. Capital to trade unions or other workers organizations for direct 
operation of enterprises. When enterprises fail or move out of the state, or 
are threatened with closure because of environmental restrictions, the Bank can 
provide capital for transfer of ownership to worker-controlled enterprises, if 
there is sufficient worker desire and capability. In Vermont, an asbestos 
plant recently affected such a transfer. In addition, in trades with heavy 
unemployment, the unions may desire to initiate or purchase an enterprise, for 
which the Bank could provide capital. If the EDC took initiative in this direc-
tion, and provided technical assistance, we might expect some significant experi-
ments in this direction, and develop a new capacity for combatting p~nt closings. 
~·· 
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Histadrut, the Israeli trade-union organization, operates some of its own 
enterprises. 
4. Capital to small and medium-sized independent businesses in the 
state. During an economic slowdown, small and particularly minority businesses 
run into difficulties partially because of capital shortages, which could be 
covered by the Bank. Independent businesses (i.e., those not branches of large 
corporations) often face the possibility of acquisition by larger corporations 
as they verge on failure, and might be suitable recipients of loans. Obviously, 
this sort of program (plus loan guarantee programs) are not new but have been 
extensively developed by the Small Business Administration and the Economic 
Development Administration. 
5. Purchase of municipal bonds. In small communities and many cities, 
banks will not underwrite general obligation bonds which might provide immediate 
employment in construction. T~e Bank could enter here either as a competitive 
bidder or a bidder of last resort if it thought the risk was worth it. Tax 
savings to local taxpayers would be realized if interest rates on bonds were 
lowered. This should qualify as a potential use of pension funds. 
6. Rural development functions. All of the described possibilities 
for the Bank include ru~al development implicitly. However, it may be desirable 
to separate and earmark funds which will specifically go to rural areas and 
coordinate those with the Depa·rtment of Agriculture. 
7. Capital to other public enterprises. The Bank should serve as 
financial intermediary for the Economic Development Corporation and its public 
enterprise functions. This may mean loans to state agencies which are estab-
lishing public enterprises, or, the bank would make loans to independent public 
corporations under the ECD. The general notion here is that the Development 
Bank ·is a major source of capital for public sector development. 
8. Capital for housing investment. While some states already have 
housing finance agencies, that function could also be incorporated into the Bank 
for the purpose of coordination with other economic development functions, or, 
the Bank may want to enter the housing market on its own. 
C. Operating Criteria 
Within the general purpose guidelines specified earlier, the Bank should 
be free to operate with a mix of decision-making criteria. The general notion 
should be that the best interests of the state are served when the Bank is self-
supporting and uses its funds on a revolving basis. Prof. Bennett Harrison of 
M. I. T,. has pointed out the disadvantage of using strict profitability criteria; 
the Bank would then just be financing activities which could otherwise be 
getting financing through conventional capital markets. He points out that 
this would hold particularly for finance through the sale of revenue bonds, 
where holders and underwriters of those bonds expect a private market rate of 
return. The state will want to support unconventional activities, he points 
out, and therefore should not be seeking private market rates of return. 
We concur, but to a limited extent. It may still be advantageous to recycle 
funds within the state, through the Bank, which require positive ratis of return 
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but which otherwise would flow out of the state. Pension funds, for example, 
require positive rates of return and should have as criteria for use by the 
Bank the following provision: the average yield on the bank's portfolio of 
investments must equal the average yield of the pension funds themselves for 
the previous three (illustrative) years. This would leave the Bank free, in 
its pension fund account, to lend at relatively low rates provided that such 
loans were balanced by higher interest loans which were relatively secure. 
With revenue bonds, the Bank would have to return at rates consonant with 
private market returns. However, direct legislative allocation could be used 
for a mix of loans at low and market rates of interest, equity and venture 
capital, and subsidized and unsubsidized mortgage money. While the general 
criteria should be self-support, the Bank should be able to be flexible in 
its lending policies, and be able to make use of funds which are earmarked for 
or desirable for outright subsidy. 
The use of state treasury deposits to provide low-interest loans is suggested 
by Harrison, who sees no reason why the state should return a profit on its 
deposits, and why it should give them to private banks for their profit, 
particularly without linking those deposits to beneficial state uses. However, 
use of these deposits without realizing the interest made from banks is merely 
a form of subsidy policy, and should be recognized as similar to direct legis-
lative allocation. An alternative· here could be use of the interest of 
treasury deposits as a continual cash flow for the Bank, a policy which would 
tie the flow of funds from private banks to the development bank concept. 
D. Organizational Questions 
The question of management and decision-making power in public enter-
prise is traditionally a difficult one. One advantage of the corporate form is 
that it al1ows the corporation a degree of autonomy from regular bureaucratic 
processes of government, thereby allowing relative speed of decision-making. 
One issue particularly important to Canadian public corporate management is 
freedom from civil service regulation; they want to be able to fire people who 
are not performing satisfactorily with relative ease, at least on administrative 
levels. Originally, the intention of some of those sponsoring Canadian public 
enterprise was to make public. corporations, like the Canadian National Railroad, 
relatively free of "political" interference, although many of its decisions 
have political implications. 
However, while political control can obviously interfere with sound management 
practices by attempting to turn an institution like the Bank into a boondoggle 
rife with favoritism, the dangers of extreme corporate autonomy are great and 
the advantages of public control may be lost. The best example of these dangers 
may be Robert Moses' Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, which operated 
like a personal fiefdom and manipulated and distorted the political process and 
the development of New York City highway and public works programs. It was no 
less (and probably more) of a "boondoggle" for being autonomous. In' Australia, 
the Labour Party has been strongly opposed to the autonomy of public corporations 
(which are extensive on both state and federal levels) on the grounds that an 
autonomous business operating for profit will tend to act the same if it i's 
public or private. 
•• 
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Thus the basic organizational preble~ of public enterprise is how to grant 
enough managerial (or worker) autonomy'for broad efficiency purposes, while 
maintaining clear political direction. At the Bank, the main conflict would 
seem to be the possibility of use of bank funds for particularistic political 
purposes on the one hand; versus the possibility that the Bank would function 
as just another bank, operating in the interests of the business community, 
on the other. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to create any organizational form which 
will insure results in the public interest. It is thus important to develop 
relatively specific mandates, along the lines presented earlier, of what con-
stitutes acceptable public interest behavior. Its Board of Directors should 
include not only appointees from the Governor's office, but also legisltive 
representatives and representatives of different administrative departments of 
the state, where relevant. Thus, even if the Bank were to fall under the 
traditional commerce department (or a newly created Economic Development and 
Planning Division, with the EDC and Bank as its main agencies), there would be 
relatively broad participation in decisions. In addition, certain gubernatorial 
appointees could be slated to include, for example, consumer representatives, 
or representatives with particular concerns for rural development •. Others, such 
as representatives of the banking industry, could be explicitly excluded. Also, 
one means of protecting against.political favoritism is full public disclosure 
of operations and accounts. Clearly, this organizational question needs exten-
sive and careful exploration, with reference to previous experiences. (Two 
useful references: The Government Corporation: Elements of a model charter, 
by Sidney Goldberg and Harold Seidman, and The Public Corporation, W. Friedmann, 
ed.) 
Economic Development Corporation (ECD) 
Direct public enterprise can be discussed in two separate but closely related 
forms: the Economic Development Corporation and the state industrial corpora-
tion. The first is the stimulator of new investment and new opportunities for 
the $tate, the long-term planner of development, and the direction of the 
location and opposition of future growth and development. The second is the 
public enterprise limited to a particular industry, organized like the Canadian 
Crown Corporation, and directly running or participating in the management of 
particular industries. 
A. General Purpose of the EDC 
The Economic Development Corporation shall be chartered to actively and 
directly promote the general economic well-being of the people of the state. 
The EDC will serve as the research, planning, initiation and investment unit of 
the state's direct participation in the economy. 
"Economic well-being" includes the following: 
1. The definitions included under the section of the Development Bank, 
though perhaps 4 may not be relevant here. 
• 
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2. Achieving the benefits of natural resource development in the 
state for the people of the state. 
3. The generation of direct revenues for the state sector. 
4. Relief from high prices which result from monopolistic pricing 
policies. 
5. Transformation from defense-related to peacetime economy, when 
necessary or desirable. 
B. Functions of the EDC 
The major function of the EDC would be that it serve as state planner 
and entrepreneur. It should initiate studies which delineate critical areas of 
need for the state's economy, and make projections of future needs. It should 
identify critical bottlenecks, and determine where monopolistic prices are 
being charged. It should provide the technical assistance and research necessary 
for the programs of the development bank. It should study the various possibil-
ities for public investment, and initiate those investments where desirable. It 
should spin off, under its direction, the public corporations which will directly ·· 
manage the enterprises. 
The EDC should jointly initiate e~ploration of public enterprise development 
with other agencies of the state, both encouraging that type of development 
and providing direct investment funds, technical assistance, and joint manage-
ment. For example, the EDC would promote rural land banking and leasing 
jointly with the Department of Agriculture's rural development program. Or, 
the EDC might initiate, through the state highway department its own contract 
construction company. Important here is the ability of the EDC to provide 
direction· and direct incentives to agencies for re-organization along enterprise 
lines. 
The EDC should provide the initial planning, feasibility, and direct investment 
in new public corporations. In some cases, this may involve purchase of 
already established companies which either may be failing or may offer the 
poten~ial for significant expansion by the state. (For example, British 
Columbia has purchased a large, previously private construction company.) In 
natural resources, for example, the state may find it advantageous to purchase 
certain mining companies or small fishing enterprises and consolidate them. 
Alternatively, where major bottlenecks or lacks in existing productive capacity 
exist (e.g., recycling), the EDC will want to directly initiate new enterprises 
and participate in their on-going m~nagement. 
The EDC may desire to undertake joint state and local (private or public) 
ventures, with the EDC providing assistance and joint management. The difference 
·here from the role of the Bank involves direct ownership of equity and direct 
management participation, rather than purely financial intermediary role. Two 
types of operations stand out here; one, the rehabilitation of failing enter-
prises which could, with assistance, function successfully; two, participation 
with municipalities and counties in funding and encouraging economic develop-
ment projects. Again, the role here is an entrepreneurial one. 
• 
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Urban land banking and preparation for the purpose of industrial development 
can play a role in the control of the location of new enterprises, rational 
land-use planning, and encouragement for new development. We should note that 
this function is not significant during a recession, both because of long-start-
up times and the present lack of shortages in land for industrial purposes. 
In fact, given the structure of the local tax system, this function may be 
minor for developmental purposes, though still important for land-use planning purposes. 
State ownership of rural land and its leasing to small farmers and rural co-
operatives can be an important tool of comprehensive rural development and 
land reform program. In Saskatchewan, this type of program has had the effect 
of allowing small farmers to remain on the land, where initial costs of land 
purchase would otherwise be too high. This would be likely to function best 
as a joint EDC-Department of Agriculture program, given the vast extension infrastructure which already exists. 
C. Organization and Decision-making 
Similar issues apply to the EDC as to the Bank (or to any quasi-
autonomous public body), which is how to make sure it serves the public interest 
while keeping it free from manipulation for particularistic and narrow political 
ends. Like the Bank, its directors should represent a mix of public repre-
sentatives and governmenta~ ~epresentatives. Its management and staff will be important; it should include people with a political commitment to public 
economic development, as well as people with technical skills and experience. 
Harrison suggests that the Mass. EDC have different desks; like the State Depart-
ment, which would be responsible for development programs and economic planning in different regions of the state, an idea which has merit for decentralizing 
some of the broad functions of the corporation. 
D. Operating Criteria 
It is unlikely that the EDC, with its broad variety of tasks, will 
operate as.a self-supporting organization despite its holdings of equity posi-
tions in some profitable enterprises. It should, however, be able to deli~eate 
those areas which shoul~ receive positive rates of return (i.e., direct invest-
ments in enterprises), and those where returns are more indirect (e.g., planning 
and technical assistance functions). It should be evaluated in terms of the 
economic development it promotes as well as the return it receives. 
(Some references: "The Economy of Massachusetts," a report by Prof. Bennett 
Harrison, prepared for the committee on labor and commerce, Mass. Legislature. Urban Economic ·Development by Bennett Harrison, Urban Institute, and Land 
Banking in the Control of Urban Development by Harvey Flechner, Praeger.) 
• 
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Direct Public Enterprise 
The direct public enterprise is at the same time the most common type of public 
economic institution and the most controversial. The examples of public 
enterprise listed earlier in our general discussion demonstrate the extent to 
which public enterprise is common. The controversy arises when the state sector 
enters those arenas which are traditionally reserved for the private sector, 
or which exist alongside of or compete with the private sector. 
However, if the state seriously wishes to take on the role of employment 
creation and develop direct economic planning capacity, it will have to be 
willing to incur opposition from the private sector, as well as cooperate with it in some of its development proposals. The analysis here is that many of 
our economic problems lie with the logic of private market operation, and it is both inefficient policy and frequently economically disruptive to marginally 
change that logic. Instead, public enterprise can operate with a different logic, that of public interest mixed with profit criteria, to remedy some of 
these ills and provide economic benefits to the state. The current proposal for a state energy corporation in California recognizes, at least implicitly, 
the notion of private sector failure. 
There is no logical (and apparently no legal) reason to restrict the state from 
any type of economic enterprise. ' Section 5 of the act which creates the British Columbia Development Corp., for example, delineates a broad range of powers for the Corporation, includi~g the right to acquire, manage, anq maintain 
any forms of real productive capacity. It will be important, however, to 
clearly state the justifications for public investment, particularly since new 
employment will not always be involved. State utilities ownership, for 
example, may have as its purposes changing the price structure and generating 
revenue for _the state; it will not necessarily generate new employment directly. 
The Crown Corporation in Canada and Canadian provinces can provide a model. It has a degree of financial autonomy, is often designated to run for profit but is aided by legislative allocations, has some autonomy in personnel selections, 
and is relatively free of the bureaucratic restrictions of the ministry it 
operates under. However, it is subject to public scrutiny in its accounts, has public representation in i:ts directors, and must justify its activities to public bodies. 
The feasibility of various types of new state enterprises will have to be 
studied in detail by the EDC. Perhaps the most useful discussion here will be to raise some ideas and make distinctions between the types of investment which 
the state can undertake~ 
The first type may be the establishment of corporations for immediate employment 
creation purposes, where at least some of the costs are returned through 
relatively stable markets (our gold example). The state could immediately initiate industries in depressed areas in products which it presently purchases from outside the state, or products which municipal governments express a 
willingness to purchase. That is, the state would develop an integrated,, 
employment-generating unit in relationship to state purchasing practices • 
• 
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Another example utilizing the particular resources of the state would be 
. development of a state Film Corp., patterned perhaps after the National Film 
Board of Canada, and encouraging independent studios and filmmakers (Pauling 
Kael would approve). Justification for such a corporation goes beyond employ-
ment creation in the film industry; it also would be a way to regain local con-
trol of an industry increasingly dominated by conglomerate corporations and 
decreasingly committed to production in the U. S. While it is unlikely that 
it wou.ld be initially self-supporting, returns.from commercial and educational 
distribution should eventually pay most of the costs. 
Low-cost resort development is another area which has potential employment-
creating affects and can effect the price level far vacations. State ski 
dorms and family resorts, bicycle and youth hostels all over the state, coastal 
resorts, and urban hostels could be close to self-supporting, depending on 
the prices charged. The state could purchase and renovate older facilities 
(including urban hotels), build new facilities where desirable and use state 
lands to minimize costs. Aside.from employment effects, such.a policy seems 
particularly desirable in the face of rapidly mounting land prices in desirable 
tourist areas and the 1 (': ulting difficulty of finding low-cost vacation facili-
ties other than camping.· Such a public tourism corporation ·could be administered 
under Parks and Recreation. 
Recycling is another area which has significant potential for expansion in the 
public interest, and should be self-supporting. There is some indication that 
recycling of glass and metals is profitable, particularly on a large scale; the 
market for paper, while likely to improve, is less stable. Presently the 
production of recycling machinery is limited to a few small firms; the state 
may want to develop joint ventures with them or purchase them and set up an 
integrated recycling industry, involving production of machinery, recycling of 
materials and perhaps use of those materials in its production processes. While 
collection and sorting themselves are estimated to provide only several thousand 
jobs statewide (ten new jobs for a city of 100,000), a fully developed recycling 
industry could probably provide significantly more. A State Recycling Corporation 
would most likely be involved with municipal garbage services in joint operations. 
High construction costs presently represent a significant deterrent to the 
building of public works as well as housing. Much of these high costs involve 
finance costs and construction companies' profits. The state couid transform 
some of its present operating capacity (particularly highway maintenance), 
purchase a company, and/or develop new capacity to enter the construction field 
as a competitive bidder on public construction projects. If this were to 
result in significant cost reductions in construction, it would have the effect 
of stimulating·employment. 
Logging, fishing, and mining are often hard hit by recessions, suffer seasonal 
unemployment, and are deterred by environmental restrictions. Public develop-
ment of these resources could respond more directly to environmental restric-
tions, for example, if it were not as constrained by immediate profit criteria 
as private companies. In addition, there may be monopolistic constraints in· 
those industries.· For example, it has been contended that canneries dictate 
policies which are unfavorable to fishermen; thus, the state could purchase or 
develop canning capacity, break those constraints, and promote employment and 
more rational development of fisheries. 
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These examples are purely illustrative. Other possible illustrations could 
include purehase and operation of branch plants which have been closed but 
could still operate profitably. We have not discussed two of the most obvious 
possibilities--housing and energy--since those are already under consideration 
in some concrete form at the state levei. Obviously, thorough study of the 
realistic range of possibilities will have to take place by an agency empowered 
to carry out policy. 
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